Mr. President, Mr. High Commissioner, Stakeholders,
Dear Members of the Fact-Fin­ding Mission, 

We thank you for your report. As expected, it details a litany of vio­lations and abuses, some of which may amount to crimes under international law. 

The “enhanced” format of this interactive dialogue is a small but necessary step for the inter­na­tional community to re-prioritise the Sudan crisis — which so far has received only a fraction of the attention it deserves. 

Last October, the FFM’s establishment was the first ray of hope for millions of victims. Since then, in light of the situation in the country and of the UN’s liquidity crisis, 80 NGOs urged states to extend the FFM’s mandate, and DefendDefenders stressed that failing to do so would be “more than a mis­ta­ke: it would be an unforgivable dereliction of duty.” 

Mr. President,

Two weeks ago, together with Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, we released a Ques­tion & Answer document that addresses key issues related to the FFM. The document shows why the FFM is uniquely placed to advance both the moral dimension of accountability (through exposure, public reporting, and as regards truth and remembrance) and its criminal dimen­sion.

The FFM’s collection and preservation of evidence functions and its ability to identify those respon­si­ble mean that it is our best collective hope to break impunity, which is at the heart of the current crisis and of cycles of violence in Sudan.

States must act now.

Thank you for your attention. 

PDF version

Link to video recording of the debate / end 

Mr. President, Mr. High Commissioner,

As this Council completes its 18^th cycle, the picture for human rights around the world is grim. In many places, illiberal forces seek to silence critical voices, under­mine free exp­res­sion and intel­lec­tual inquiry, and restrict the space citizens and civil society have to express themselves, protest, and asso­ciate free from undue interference.

Civic space is under attack in Africa. Restrictive laws and policies and abusive prac­tices have a di­rect consequence: human rights defenders (HRDs), lawyers, journalists and other indepen­dent ac­tors are at risk, particularly as, in several coun­tries, elections approach. 

Mr. High Commissioner, we call on you to enhance your Office’s civic space-related work, including to identify early warning signs of crises. 

Mr. President,

We reiterate our concerns over the Sahel, in particular Mali and Burkina Faso, and over unconsti­tu­tional changes of government across the continent.

In Ethiopia, inc­rea­sed pressure over HRDs, including in relation to their engagement with UN mecha­nisms, could be further compounded by plans, recently an­nounced by the Prime Minister, to back­track­ on the 2019 CSO Proclamation.

In Kenya, we are concer­ned over impunity for violence against protesters, including in relation to un­rest following the introduction of a tax bill, earlier this year. This is not the first episode where the right to peaceful assembly is severely violated. We call for impartial and thorough investigations into these incidents, as well as cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. 

Lastly, Mr. President, closed slates undermine HRC elections. For the Africa Group, this means that competition based on human rights criteria is eliminated and states that are unfit for membership get elected.

The Human Rights Council deserves better. Africa deserves better. Africans deserve better.

Thank you for your attention. 

PDF version

Link to video recording of the debate / continued / end (NGOs speaking)

[Original statement delivered in French] 

Mr. President, Mr. Special Rapporteur, 

Burundi is back as a member of this Council. Its election does not reflect respect for membership criteria in any way, nor does it reflect any improvement in the domestic human rights situation: it is the result of seat distribution games and of the absence of competition.

In Burundi, serious violations continue to be committed in a context of generalised impunity. As the country prepares for legislative and presidential elections in a tense national and regional environ­ment, the Council should maintain its scrutiny of the situation. Our organizations call for the exten­sion of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate. In our letter, we emphasise: (1) Significant risk factors in relation to upcoming elections; and (2) Violations of the socio-economic rights of Burundians.

The Burundian government continues to deny the gravity of the situation. It refuses to meaningfully cooperate with independent human rights mechanisms. Once again, we urge it to change course. 

Mr. Zongo,

We thank you for your report, which is comprehensive and unambiguous. It shows the many facets of the crisis in Burundi and its impact on the rights of Burundians.

The government refuses to grant you access for an official visit, or even to engage in a dialogue with you. What minimum measure could it take to cooperate with the mechanisms of the Council, of which it is now a member? 

Thank you for your kind attention. 

PDF version (French and English)

Link to video recording of the debate 

Mr. President,

DefendDefenders delivered a statement during the debate on Sudan, a situation that requires the Council’s utmost attention. The Sudanese crisis fulfils the criteria outlined in operative paragraph 3 of UN General Assembly resolution 60/251, which mandates the Human Rights Council to “address situ­ations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations.” The essence of this provision is captured by the Council’s agenda item 4, and this is where Sudan should be consi­dered. 

Mr. President,

Once again, we take the opportunity of this general debate to demand an independent, impartial, tho­rough and effective investigation into the assassination of human rights lawyer Thulani Maseko in Eswatini. The fact that no perpetrators have been brought to justice shows state inaction in response to this cowardly assassination. We also urge the authorities to de­sist from harassing Thulani’s wife, Tanele, as well as human rights defenders and lawyers. 

We also reiterate our deepest concerns over the human rights situation in Burkina Faso, Mali, and the Greater Sahel. The Sahel should be a matter of priority concern for regional actors and for this Council. 

Human rights defenders are fleeing Ethiopia, a clear sign of the extreme climate of fear that inde­pen­dent actors face. Plans to amend the 2019 CSO Proclamation, as well as threats directed at civil so­ciety and the national human rights institution (EHRC), are extremely worrying. 

In Tanzania, the current trends should be reversed as the country will soon enter an election period. Inde­pen­dent, impartial investigations must be conducted into all cases of alleged extrajudicial kil­lings, enforced disappearances and other violations, including against independent actors. 

Thank you for your attention. 

PDF version

Link to video recording of the debate / continued / continued / end

[Original statement delivered in French] 

Mr. President, Madam Assistant Secretary-General, 

We welcome the Secretary-General’s report, but regret the disappearance of cases men­tio­ned in pre­vious years. An absence of new developments does not mean that a case is re­solved; often, it means that reprisals are ongoing and that the authorities are betting on oblivion to secure a win.

We remain deeply concerned about the safety and well-being of Kadar Abdi Ibrahim in Djibouti. His case is not mentioned in this year’s report; yet it is unresolved. After Mr. Ibrahim parti­ci­pated in Uni­ver­sal Periodic Review (UPR) pre-sessions, in April 2018, Djiboutian authorities confiscated his pass­port without due pro­cess. For six years, he has been held hostage in his own coun­try. This travesty must stop. 

Mr. President,

Insofar as they are designed to prevent the UN, its repre­sen­tatives and mechanisms from receiving information rele­vant to their work, acts of reprisal and intimidation undermine the integrity of the UN system. They are unacceptable.

Once again, we condemn reprisals exercised by Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, and Libya. We call for on­going public reporting on all pending cases. 

Last, we take the opportunity of this debate to denounce the pattern of restrictions civil society faces at the UN Office at Geneva (UNOG), including in accessing this Palais and entering this plenary room. 

Thank you for your attention. 

PDF version

Link to video recording of the debate 

Mr. President, 

Last July, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 56/17, which extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Eritrea. Doing so, a majority of states made clear that Eritrea’s attempts to use its seat on the Council (2019-2024) to cover up its abuses and evade scrutiny had failed.

DefendDefenders sees the UPR as a complementary process, which should not divert attention from country-spe­ci­fic scrutiny and reporting.

The government’s replies to the recommendations received during its fourth review show an appal­lingly low rate of acceptance: 44%. This reflects the 126 fully supported and 155 fully noted recom­mendations (an additional seven were partly supported, and another five noted with clarifications). If anything, after four cycles and despite the official discourse praising the UPR as the “only le­gi­ti­ma­te” process to review a country’s record, Eritrea is less and less open to engagement with the inter­na­tional community. 

Mr. President,

A look at supported recommendations takes you to a parallel dimension, where Eritrea ac­cepts to “[m]ain­tain full cooperation with the [Council] and its mechanisms” (132.60); “[c]on­ti­nue to streng­then measures to improve the conditions of prisoners” (132.111); or “[i]ncrease the school enrol­ment rate for girls” (132.226). 

In practice, cooperation is non-existent; prisoners suffer unspeakable abuses, when they are lucky not to be held incommunicado for decades; and the last year of high school, served at Sawa military camp, means sexual harassment and exploitation for female students. 

A look at noted recommendations takes you back to reality, as you understand that the gov­ern­ment is not ready to “[a]dopt legislation criminalizing violence against women” (132.258-.261); “[e]nd […] pro­longed detention without charge and trial” (132.105); “end […] all forms of reprisals ag­ainst civil so­ciety […]” (132.131); or even “[a]l­low independent civil society organizations to operate” (132.135). 

Thank you for your attention.

PDF version

Link to video recording of the debate 

Mr. President, Mr. High Commissioner, 

Six months ago, the Human Rights Council did the right thing by refusing to discontinue the mandate of the Com­mis­sion on Human Rights in South Sudan (CHRSS). One of the arguments the South Suda­nese government and allies used was that the country only needed “technical assistance” to over­come its challenges. 

Today, with a majority of the Council, we repeat civil society’s message that an investigative and acc­oun­tability me­ch­a­nism remains vital. Scrutiny remains vital, including over the conduct of the Natio­nal Security Service (NSS), which creates a climate of fear for citizens, civil society, and the media. 

Two years ago, we were promised that a two-year extension of the transitional period was the “last” and that elections would take place in December 2024. And here we are, facing another extension. While lack of preparedness for elections this year was entirely predictable, and their postponement to December 2026 could offer an opportunity to conduct a census and operationalise key institutions and dispute resolu­tion mechanisms, we fear that the additional time will not be used to reduce risks and uncertainty over the constitution-making and electoral process, but rather to buy time and fur­ther delay the implemen­tation of the Revitalised Peace Agreement and its transitional justice com­po­nents. Yet accountability is essential for long-term peace. 

Today, we repeat what we said in 2021, 2022 and 2023: What South Sudan needs, first and foremost, is political will. Without political will to bring violations to an end and en­sure accountability for grave crimes, all the technical assistance in the world will be ineffective. 

Thank you for your attention.

PDF version

Mr. President, Madam Independent Expert,   

We thank you for your report. We welcome your assessment of progress against the benchmarks and indicators. We stress that enhancing human rights compliance by police and other security forces and ensuring accountability for grave violations are absolute priorities. We also en­dor­se your recom­mendations under Bench­marks 3 to 7.

We welcome constitutional and legislative develop­ments and highlight the importance of a “one-person, one-vote” election system.

Human rights challenges remain numerous. In addition to grave abuses committed by terrorist group Al-Shabaab, we are concerned about violations committed by Somali security and intelligence for­ces. These include harassment and intimidation of independent actors. National In­tel­ligence and Security Agency (NISA) officials must be held to ac­count for their actions.

Many of the 1964 Penal Code provisions are contrary to the Constitution and international standards and are used to suppress media freedom. It is of utmost importance to investigate and prosecute attacks against HRDs, inclu­ding journalists, and to provide redress. 

Mr. President,

We call on the Council to extend the Independent Expert’s mandate and to remain actively seized of the matter. Adequate financial and human resources should be allocated to the mandate, including to support the adjustments to the scope of the mandate suggested by Madam Dyfan.

Somalia-focused resolutions have been a model of a sensible use of agenda item 10, with the con­sent and ownership of the country concerned and access to the country for the Independent Expert, as well as scrutiny elements, which are intertwined with technical assistance and capacity-building. These resolutions are not mutually exclusive with, but complementary to, OHCHR technical support. They should continue for the foreseeable future. 

Thank you for your attention.

PDF version