The first section, which can be read independently of the other two (or skipped by those who are mainly interested in the analysis of protests in national contexts), examines the right to protest as a concept. It also outlines the scope of the right to protest, namely, what protections people enjoy as rights-holders, as well as state obligations.

In Section I, DefendDefenders shows:

–     That the right to protest is a cornerstone of democracy, and that the exercise of freedoms of peaceful assembly and association is intertwined with human dignity;

–     That the “right to protest,” however, does not exist as such in human rights instruments (rather, it is located at the intersection of a number of recognised rights and freedoms and is implicit in guarantees provided by these);

–     That the right to peaceful protest is protected under numerous human rights instruments – not directly as such but through protections afforded to the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association, as well as non-discrimination guarantees; and

–     That peaceful protests are much broader than demonstrations and take many forms.

DefendDefenders then presents standards on the right to peaceful protest following an original structure, with due reference to applicable international and African law, academic sources, and interpretations by human rights experts. Sub-sections 3 and 4 present:

–     Basic protections and states’ negative obligations (including, first and foremost, the obligation not to interfere with or unduly restrict peaceful protests), as well as the “three-part test” (which refers to the conditions of legality, necessity and proportionality for any restrictions to be valid); and

–     States’ positive obligations (obligations to take proactive measures – including a general obligation to facilitate peaceful protests).

The second section is based on responses to a survey. Altogether, they provide a “big picture” for the right to protest in Africa. The data collected enabled DefendDefenders to identify major trends and patterns across the continent (issues and practices that are widespread or systematic) and paved the way for a more detailed analysis of national contexts (Section III).

Among the patterns identified are the following:

–     Protesting in Africa is more and more difficult as it involves risks, including of physical harm and repression, and the environment for the right to protest is less and less conducive;

–     Legal regimes governing the organisation of protests often deter the exercise of rights (contrary to international and African standards, prior authorisation is common practice and, in many places, authorities have turned “notification” regimes into “prior authorisation” regimes);

–     Protesters are increasingly turning to online spaces and using digital tools, including social media, to hold protest actions;

–     The topics or issues addressed by protests revolve around injustice, human rights violations and impunity; political reforms, elections and democracy; corruption, poverty and public services; and, increasingly, environmental issues;

–     State authorities and officials hold unfavourable views of protests and often use stigmatising and aggressive rhetoric to refer to protesters (“hooligans “rioters,” “criminals,” “rebels,” “enemies of the country,” promoters of “foreign agendas,” etc.);

–     The most significant factors triggering a negative response by state authorities are the theme or issue in focus and the identity of the organisers (this points to a lack of neutrality, as authorities are more “triggered” by the content, or messages, of protests more by than objective public order or security risks – for instance the number of participants);

–     Denials (of requests for permission) and bans (of notified protests) are frequent, and authorities rarely propose alternatives to protest organisers;

–     Spontaneous protests are not tolerated – but, by contrast to what they observe for protests centred around critical, anti-government messages, pro-government assemblies are allowed to proceed without hindrance, even when they are spontaneous;

–     In many African countries, authorities do not facilitate, but rather hinder and deter, protests. This is evidenced by the inadequate training and equipment of forces managing public assemblies (with firearms posing a specific problem), frequent dispersal of protests, or the fact that protest monitors, including human rights defenders and journalists, face risks in relation to their work;

–     In breach of international and regional standards on states’ facilitation of protests, the use of force is the rule rather than the exception: the use of force is often unwarranted, and very often excessive; state authorities do not approach the use of force as a measure of last resort and in strict compliance with principles of precaution, necessity, and proportionality;

–     Law enforcement and security forces usually fail to distinguish between protest participants based on their individual behaviour, but rather use force as a collective punishment;

–     The weapons and methods used by law enforcement and security forces (including lethal weapons and “less-lethal” weapons) are often inadequate; they reflect a militarisation of law enforcement and authorities’ view of protesters as enemies or threats to their hold on power;

–     Impunity for violations committed against protesters is widespread, as evidenced by the quasi-absence of investigations and the near-total absence of sanctions against perpetrators; and

–     A number of positive aspects and trends, which include: the fact that many human rights defenders and organisations monitor and report on peaceful protests and are equipped with the conceptual and operational tools to do so in an effective manner; the fact that themes that are central to recent protests have a universal appeal; the fact that women and youth movements are more and more involved in protests; and the fact that despite restrictions, disruptions and risks of surveillance, in most countries, online spaces now play an indispensable role in relation to protests.

The largest section, section III, is based on information collected from 87 sources in four countries. It starts by presenting an overview of national frameworks in Mozambique, Senegal, Tunisia, and Uganda – including constitutional and legal frameworks as well as operating environments (civic space). It then presents findings for the four countries, from a comparative perspective, around seven major themes that capture key dimensions of the right to protest and its exercise.

Notification vs. prior authorisation

DefendDefenders found that prior authorisation is the rule to organise protests. In the four countries, interviewees described an environment in which notification requirements are interpreted as establishing authorisation regimes, granting state authorities the power to give (or deny) permission to organisers. Interviewees pointed to authorities’ failure to abide by their content neutrality obligation – when and where protesters are seen as being “anti-government,” notifications are much more likely to be rejected.

Interviewees described different levels of bureaucracy to hold a protest in the four focus countries. Most preparatory and other activities associated with protests seem to be allowed to take place in Mozambique, Senegal, and Tunisia (interviewees did not report specific threats or risks at that level), but not in Uganda. In all four countries, however, state authorities have little to no tolerance for spontaneous assemblies: dispersal (with or without violence and with or without arrests) is the standard response. 

State authorities’ approach to, and facilitation of, protests

Authorities generally hold a negative view of protests. In Mozambique, Tunisia and Uganda, authorities use a stigmatising and sometimes aggressive rhetoric to refer to protesters, with a view to delegitimising them or their causes. Senegal is a more complex case, as the new authorities came to power following mass popular protests. In all four countries, however, topics centred around criticism of the authorities are the most likely to trigger a negative response. Everywhere, environment-related protests are increasingly sensitive, and authorities are increasingly nervous about youth- and student-led protests.

When authorities reject a notification for (or deny permission to) a protest, they usually do not propose meaningful alternatives to the organisers. In terms of access to places where meaningful protest can occur, protesters in the four focus countries face different situations, with various “emblematic” as well as “off-limit” places. Restrictions observed in Uganda are particularly concerning. By contrast, pro-government/pro-ruling party demonstrations are held without restrictions – which shows differential treatment.

Protests are generally facilitated by regular law enforcement forces, such as the police. Military forces are usually absent and do not deal with protests in Mozambique, Senegal and Tunisia. In Uganda, on the contrary, public spaces are increasingly militarised, with a chilling effect on protesters.

In all four countries, significant flaws affect the training and equipment of forces facilitating protests. Law enforcement and security forces are heavily equipped, in a way that is often incompatible with the facilitation of protests. With regard to training, sources provided less consistent answers across the four focus countries, but all pointed to political will – more than the number or quality of trainings law enforcement officers receive – as the key factor for the creation of a human rights-compliant mindset.

The use of force in relation to protests

In the four focus countries, DefendDefenders found that before protests, authorities resort to dialogue with protesters, to some extent. During protests, dialogue is much less evident. As a result, the use of force is not exceptional but rather frequent.

Law enforcement and security forces tend to use force quickly, without adequate warnings, and sources in all four countries described patterns of unwarranted, excessive and disproportionate force against protesters. When resorting to force, authorities fail to distinguish between peaceful and non-peaceful protesters – and use violence as a collective punishment or to create a chilling effect that deters people from exercising their right to protest. Additional problems lie with the methods and weapons used, which do not allow for distinction (this particularly the case for tear gas and other toxic substances).

Overall levels of violence reported are mild in Senegal (except during the 2021-2024 period); mild to moderate (but increasing) in Tunisia; moderate in normal times, but severe in the recent period in Mozambique; and severe in Uganda. Regarding the main risks faced by protesters, sources mentioned arrests, violence (police brutality), arbitrary detentions, prosecution without due process, reprisals in the private sphere, and even enforced disappearances and killings. In all four countries, sources reported that injured protesters usually do not have access to medical care immediately.

Online spaces and the use of digital tools 

Social media has become an indispensable tool, serving not only to monitor protests but also to organise and mobilise for them, report on them, expose violations, and push for accountability. Some protests do not take place in the physical world but exclusively online, and online protests are increasingly frequent – this reflects the obstacles and risks faced in holding in-person protests. People increasingly go online to express their grievances.

There are risks and drawbacks to the use of online spaces, however. Everywhere, sources flagged digital divides, as well as a temptation to “stay online” and not join physical protests. They also flagged the fact that state authorities have enhanced their surveillance and profiling capacity. Although they are not systematic, Internet shutdowns appear to be on the rise. It is a recent practice, used mainly in relation to elections and during crisis situations.

Gender dimensions: women’s and girls’ enjoyment of their right to protest

Sources did not identify a gender gap in relation to notifying authorities of or requesting permission for a protest. Only in Uganda did interviewees report that women are often mocked, demeaned or insulted, and face backlash from their communities, for holding protests.

However, gender stereotypes, patriarchal attitudes, and conservative approaches to gender roles were mentioned as factors explaining the widespread verbal abuse women protesters face. In all four countries, insults and derogatory remarks are frequently hurled at protesters by police and other law enforcement and security forces, some of which are gendered. These insults revolve around sexuality, traditional gender roles, and body shaming, and some categories of women and girls are specifically targeted. Patterns of verbal and symbolic violence are often intersectional.

Physical violence against women protesters is also widespread. Women and girls in protests face specific forms of abuse, including sexual violence.

Human rights defenders’ and other independent actors’ role in monitoring and reporting on protests

In the four countries, monitoring and reporting on protests come with different levels of risk. Depending on the national context, journalists, human rights defenders and protest monitors may face targeting by law enforcement and security forces. Wearing a “Press” vest may or may not be protective.

Depending on the national context, authorities’ responses to reports of violations committed in relation to protests (media coverage, reports) revolve around three strategies: (1) Ignore; (2) Deny or downplay violations (or blame protesters); and (3) Engage.

Accountability for violations

To assess whether authorities ensure accountability for violations committed in relation to protests, DefendDefenders enquired about transparency in law enforcement (practices in relation to wearing uniforms, displaying identity numbers, and revealing agents’ face) and investigations and sanctions.

While in all four countries, regular police forces wear uniforms, everywhere, sources flagged the use of undercover agents to infiltrate protests. They also flagged that ID numbers are rarely displayed or visible and that identifying clear chains of command may not always be easy.

Investigations into violations are ineffective and rarely lead to accountability. Sources in all four focus countries pointed to the predominance of “internal” investigations over judicial processes, and all stressed the non-public character of these investigations, be they fully internal (by an in-house inquiry body) or by a statutory independent oversight body. All were clear that these investigations are not transparent and do not lead to meaningful accountability. Disciplinary action, therefore, is elusive. Judicial (criminal) investigations are rare – DefendDefenders was struck to hear sources from all four countries use the same words, almost verbatim, to describe what happens to criminal complaints filed against police officers: they “never go anywhere.”

Therefore, redress is elusive for protesters whose rights have been violated. State institutions, including the judicial system, were widely described as ineffective in upholding protesters’ rights and securing redress. Very few cases in which reparations were awarded were mentioned. The avenues sources mentioned the most in relation to obtaining a form of justice were the media and non-profit actors (civil society organisations, pro bono lawyers).