Mr. President, Mr. Special Rapporteur, Stakeholders, 

We thank you for your updates. Last July, this Council did the right thing by extending the Special Rapporteur’s mandate. It was im­portant to do so, in line with civil society expectations, to cover the entirety of Eritrea’s membership in the Council (2019-2024). For Eritrea, six years of membership meant six years of scrutiny. 

It was also important to do so to send a message to all states that seek to join the HRC to evade scrutiny. As we highlighted: “Eritrea joined the Council to cover up its abuses, but its manoeuvre fail­ed as a majority of states made clear that membership is not a shield against scru­tiny.” 

In the country, violations continue with impunity. They include arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detention, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, forced labour, sexual and gender-based violence, severe restrictions to civic space, and indefinite conscription into na­tional/military service. 

Three years after the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement regarding Tigray, fears are gro­wing over ano­ther round of armed conflict in the Horn of Africa. Eritrean authorities have recently issued a directive to all regional ad­ministrations to register and mobilise citizens under the age of 60 for military re-training. Indivi­duals under 50 are prohibited from leaving the country. Reports indicate that regional adminis­tra­tions have begun the process of informing, registering, and mobilising rele­vant citizens. We call on states to urge Eritrea and other regional actors to halt any escalation towards war. 

Mr. President, 

At its next session, the Council should further move away from the approach that has prevailed since 2019, which rests upon an annual resolution that is short and procedural. The next Eritrea-focused resolution should be strong and substantive. It should fully and accurately reflect the country’s hu­man rights situation, including the domestic situation and its impact abroad, including extra­ter­ri­to­rial attacks against the Eritrean diaspora.  

Thank you for your attention. 

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Mr. President, Mr. High Commissioner,

We thank you for your report. DefendDefenders welcomes your efforts to docu­ment and report on the situation in Sudan. We stress the value of each mechanism on Sudan, namely your Office and its global mandate, your Expert on human rights in Sudan, the OHCHR coun­try office, and the Fact-Fin­ding Mission (FFM) for Sudan. 

As your report highlights, Sudan’s situation remains catastrophic. Sudan currently is the world’s lar­gest humani­tarian and displacement crisis. We sha­re your assessment that “parties to the conflict [continue] to show utter disregard for inter­na­tio­nal law and for the protection of civilians.” The con­flict, which shows no sign of abating, threatens the country’s unity and the stability of the Horn of Africa, with grave implications for international peace and se­cu­rity.

We welcome the Expert’s advocacy priorities, expressed on the occasion of his July 2024 visit to Port Sudan, namely the protection of civilians, unhindered humanitarian access, the removal of restric­tions to civil society’s work, and accountability. Authorities can take immediate steps, which do not have financial implications, to facilitate the work of civil society organisations, humanitarians and human rights defen­ders (HRDs). For instance, they must urgently facilitate delivery of visas. They, and RSF forces, must stop the practice of labelling independent civil society, medical and humani­tarian actors “collaborators” – and they must ensure due process and fair trials. We also urge au­­thorities in Port Sudan to cooperate with all UN and African human rights mechanisms, without selectivity or cherry-picking.

Mr. President,

We stress the need for more international attention to Sudan’s crisis, for more support to Sudanese HRDs and civic actors, and for a coherent global policy response. Sudan must be re-prioritised to pre­vent more atrocities, more human suf­fer­ing, and the dis­location of the country.

Thank you for your attention. 

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Mr. President, Commissioners, 

We thank you for your report.

Ahead of this session, over 100 organisations urged the Council to adopt a resolution on the human rights situation in South Sudan. Beyond the specific asks they formulated, including exten­ding the mandate of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (CHRSS) in full for two years, they stressed the need for the Council to send a strong message to all South Sudanese parties after a new extension of the transitional period and a new postponement of the country’s national elections.

These delays reflect South Sudanese leaders’ failure to implement the 2018 revitalised peace agree­ment and to deliver on their commitment to usher in a new era for the country. They confirm the au­tho­rities’ flagrant disregard for the condition of South Sudanese citizens.

South Sudan stands at a critical moment. It is facing a political, institutional, security, humanitarian, economic, and human rights crisis. Among the issues highlighted in the civil society letter, we stress the need for maximum pressure over the National Security Service (NSS), an abusive agency directly under the authority of the President, which saw its unchecked arbitrary powers confirmed in 2024. The NSS’s authority to arrest and detain anyone with or without a warrant on the basis of va­gue­ly-defined national security offences presents a formidable obstacle to an open civic and demo­cra­tic space and to free, fair, secure, and credible elections. 

Commissioners:

At this juncture, as risk factors of further violence and atrocities multiply, we stress the im­por­tance of your mandate not only with regard to accountability, but also in relation to the Council’s prevention mandate. Your work is truly vital.

What strategy can be used to ensure that the mechanisms envi­sioned in Chapter V of the revi­ta­lised agreement, namely the Commission for Truth, Recon­ci­liation and Healing (CTRH), the Compen­sa­tion and Reparation Authority (CRA) and the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS), are all esta­blished and operationalised at the same time, as part of a holistic transitional justice effort? 

Thank you. 

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[statement delivered in French]

Mr. President,  

We thank the High Commissioner for his update. We share his approach to civic space and encou­ra­ge his Office to further build its capacity to identify and respond to early warning signs of crises, inc­lu­ding attacks against human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society.

The role of human rights defenders and organisations cannot be overstated – not only for human rights promotion and protection, but also for security and stability, as they are part and parcel of ef­fective alert systems and conflict prevention efforts. 

Mr. President,

We reiterate our call on this Council to address situations based on their merits and objective cri­teria.

Considering the importance of examining civic space indicators to assess country situations and of using civic space restrictions as early warning signs of crises, we raise concern over:

• The suspension of civil society organisations. Prominent human rights NGOs, including the Cen­tre for Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EH­RCO), the Ethiopian Hu­man Rights Defenders Center (EHRDC) and Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) in Ethiopia, as well as the Network of Human Rights Defenders in Central Africa (REDHAC) in Cameroon, have recently been suspended or re-suspended. 
  We take note of the lifting of the suspension of the first four, announced on 3 March, but warn of the potentially temporary nature of this measure. 
• The vilification of, and threats against, civic actors, as in Kenya in relation to Finance Bill protests in 2024.

We express solidarity with HRDs in the eastern DRC, who need support and protection.

Last, in Burundi, we call for the immediate and unconditional release of journalist Sandra Muhoza, who has been detained on trumped-up charges for almost a year. 

Thank you for your attention. 

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[Statement delivered by video]

Mr. President,

All eyes should be on Ethiopia. But by discontinuing the mandate of its investigative me­cha­nism, ICHREE, this Coun­cil made itself blind to the country’s human rights situation. 

Since this regrettable decision was made, in October 2023, what have we seen?

• Ongoing violence and fighting in several regions of the country, including Amhara and Oromia, and serious tensions in Tigray;
• Attacks on independent actors, including civil society and the media, as well as against the Ethio­­pian Human Rights Commission (EHRC). This trend is exemplified by the suspension or re-suspension of Ethiopia’s most prominent human rights organisations – we acknowledge the lift­ing of suspensions, announced on 3 March 2025, but caution about ongoing grave civic space restrictions, including to freedoms of expression and association;
• A failure to implement key provisions of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, including regarding disar­mament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants;
• A flawed transitional justice process that is failing victims and survivors of the conflict in Nor­thern Ethiopia (at least 600,000 deaths, thousands of women and girls raped, and scores dis­placed); and
• Bullying and threats domestically, regionally (as shown by tensions with Ethiopia’s neigh­bours) and internationally.

CIVICUS has downgraded Ethiopia from “Repressed” to “Closed,” its worst Civic Space Monitor ra­ting. Ethiopia’s score, the result of a multi-year assault on civic freedoms, puts it among 29 other coun­tries in the worst category.

It is high time for states to consider bringing Ethiopia back to the Council’s agenda. We specifically call on: (1) the European Union and supporters to define a credible path towards a new resolution; (2) African states to make clear they will not oppose collective action; and (3) Other states to support action, based on objective criteria, to advance justice and accountability.

Thank you for your attention. 

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[Statement delivered by video] [Check against delivery]

Mr. President, 

We welcome Ethiopia’s acceptance of a large number of recom­men­dations received during its fourth UPR review. We are concerned, however, about the disconnect between the official dis­course and the practice. 

On the positive side, we welcome the government’s acceptance of recommendations pertaining to: 

• Accountability: These include recommendations to “address impunity […]” (no. 58.103 by Sier­ra Leone), “ensure that all per­pe­tra­tors of human rights violations and abuses [are] held to ac­count” (no. 58.126 by the UK), or “en­su­re that women and girls who are survivors of […] sexual violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, participate in decision-making processes that affect them […]” (no. 58.286 by Panama).
• Peace and transitional justice: These include recommendations on ensuring that all justice pro­cesses are victim-cen­tred and human rights-compliant (no. 58.38 to 58.42, by Bel­gium, Cyp­rus, Ireland, Austria and Croatia), accelerating the “imple­men­tation of transitional justice and reparation mechanisms” (no. 58.49 by Cameroon), or “[fulfilling] commitments under the Ces­sa­tion of Hostilities Agree­ment in all conflict-affected areas, especially in Tigray” (no. 58.221, by Korea).

It is when we examine details of the government’s replies that the picture gets more complex. The government accepted recommendations on human rights defenders and civic spa­ce, for instance, to “[remove] legal and procedural obstacles to the activities of civil society, the media, and NGOs” (no. 58.118 by Austria) or to “protect journalists and other human rights activists and repeal any le­gis­lation that hinders freedom of expression and opinion” (58.138 by Ghana). In practice, Ethiopia is intensifying its crackdown on independent voices, including human rights actors and those reporting on conflicts in several regions of the country.  

We note the lifting of suspensions of four human rights NGOs, announced three weeks ago, but high­light the legal and administrative instability that surrounds the operations of human rights defenders and civil society. We urge the government to desist from any form of intimidation, harass­ment, vili­fication and threats directed at independent actors.

The government’s replies to other civic space-related recommendations exemplify its doublespeak. Indeed, recommendations no. 58.102 (on “[ending] arbitrary detentions of human rights defenders and activists,” offered by Chile) and 58.141 (on “[protecting] journalists, human rights defenders, and members of the political opposition against harassment, attacks or undue interference and end the practice of arresting, detaining and prosecuting them,” offered by Germany), which are more precise and involve a commitment to act on the state’s obligations, were noted (rejected). 

Last, Mr. President, we are puzzled by Ethiopia’s selective cooperation with human rights mecha­nisms and selective com­mitment to international human rights law. The government refused to issue a standing invitation to special procedures (recom­men­dations no. 58.27 to 58.31) or to “fully imp­le­ment the recommendations made by the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia [ICHREE]” (no. 58.35). It also refused to ratify key instruments such as the Con­vention on Enforced Disappearances (no. 58.3 to 58.8) or the OP-CAT (no. 58.10 and 58.11).

Ethiopia’s membership in the Council should be an opportunity to reconsider its position on rejected recommendations. 

Thank you for your attention. 

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[Statement delivered by video]

Mr. President,

We acknowledge South Sudan’s cooperation with UN human rights mechanisms.

We reiterate that while no one op­po­ses the provision of advisory services, technical assistance alone is not enough to address South Sudan’s many challenges. What the country needs is, first and fore­most, political will to improve its human rights record and end impunity.

We call on states to support draft resolution L.6, which seeks to extend the mandate of the Commis­sion on Human Rights in South Sudan (CHRSS).

Mr. President, 

Contrary to what we heard during the item 2 debate, on 28 February 2025, we stress:

• That South Sudan is not a “post-conflict” country, As we speak, fighting in Upper Nile, Western Equatoria and other states, as well as tensions in Juba, threaten to nullify the Revitalized Peace Agreement and bring South Sudan back into large-scale conflict.
• That the country’s leadership has failed to implement the Revitalized Agreement, failed to make structural progress on human rights, and failed the South Sudanese people by showing flagrant disregard for their rights and dignity.
• That the country already receives technical assistance, including through both the CHRSS and OHCHR.

Bringing South Sudan’s laws, policies and practices in line with international standards is the most urgent priority for technical assistance. We flag reform of the National Security Service (NSS) as a prio­rity area for any future technical assistance. This includes repealing Sections 54 and 55 of the NSS Act, which empower the agency to target independent actors, with the potential to undermine pros­pects for free, fair, se­cure, and credible elections.

We draw the Council’s attention to statements (8 March, 27 March 2025) by the CHRSS. The Coun­cil should stand ready to respond to any developments, including through an urgent debate or special session. 

Thank you.   

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