Is the tide turning? How states vote on Africa-focused resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council

Is the Tide Turning? 

How states vote on Africa-focused resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council 

In a report published today, DefendDefenders and AfricanDefenders analyse how states vote on resolutions addressing the human rights situation in African countries at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC).

This analysis of Africa-focused resolutions is comprehensive, evidence-based, and the first of its kind.

Building on “Between Principles and Pragmatism,” a 2022 report in which DefendDefenders and AfricanDefenders analysed African states’ voting record at the HRC, this new report acts as its twin and complement. It covers all votes on Africa-focused resolutions that took place since the Council’s creation, in 2006, namely from its 1st (HRC1) to its 55th session (HRC55).

The report covers a total of 28 resolutions that were adopted by vote and builds its findings on another 148 Africa-focused resolutions that were adopted by consensus. In total, since 2006, the HRC has adopted 176 resolutions addressing the situation in African countries. These form the report’s factual basis.

The report’s Annexes can be used as a database of Africa-focused resolutions at the Council, covering 18 years (from 2006 to 2024).

 

“Is the Tide Turning?” is AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD HERE

 


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Building on “Between Principles and Pragmatism,” a report in which DefendDefenders and AfricanDefenders analysed African states’ voting record at the UN Human Rights Council, this new report looks at states’ voting patterns from a different angle. It analyses not how African states vote on HRC resolutions, but how states from all regional groups vote on a subset of resolutions, namely those addressing the human rights situation in African countries. This analysis of Africa-focused resolutions is comprehensive, evidence-based, and the first of its kind.

“Is the Tide Turning?” examines, among others: (i) How states vote on resolutions on African countries; (ii) Whether factors or determinants of vote can be identified; (iii) Why resolutions are put to a vote, as opposed to being adopted by consensus; (iv) What kind of initiatives states support/oppose the most; (v) Whether the behaviour of different groups of states differs; and (vi) Whether evolutions can be identified.

To answer these questions, resolutions and voting results are thoroughly reviewed. The report covers all Africa-focused resolutions on which a vote took place since the Council’s creation, in 2006 (that is, 28 resolutions adopted over the course of 55 regular sessions and 11 special sessions on African states). In addition, the report builds its findings on all Africa-focused resolutions adopted by consensus (148 to date). In total, since its creation, the Council has adopted 176 resolutions addressing the situation in African countries. These form the report’s factual basis. The report’s Annexes can be used as a database of Africa-focused resolutions at the Council, covering 18 years (from 2006 to 2024).

 

The report’s key findings include the following:

  • Most Africa-focused resolutions are consensual, i.e., they are adopted without a vote, often under the HRC’s agenda item 10 (“technical assistance and capacity-building”). This means that when it comes to Africa-focused resolutions, consensus is the typical scenario. Most initiatives enjoy the consent of the country concerned. A breakdown by period shows that in the Council’s early days, almost all resolutions on African countries were consensual – voting was a rare occurrence.
  • A significant shift occurred around the Council’s 10th anniversary (2016), and the trend observed in regular sessions has been mirrored by a similar trend in special sessions. As a result, the scarcity of adversarial Africa-focused resolutions ended. At 18, the Council has reached a situation in which votes on resolutions on African countries are now frequent and expected. This does not mean, however, that consensual resolutions on African countries disappeared. That category remains the largest.
  • This trend is concomitant with, and correlated to, shifts in the use of agenda items. In recent sessions, a relative decline in the use of item 10 and a relative increase in the use of item 4 and (this is particularly striking) item 2 have been observed. The increase in the share of adversarial resolutions is the result of, or at least is concomitant with, the decrease in the share of resolutions presented under item 10.
  • In terms of voting patterns, disparities between regional groups are significant. African Group members, and to some extent, Asia-Pacific states, are more reluctant to support (and more likely to vote “No” to or to abstain on) Africa-focused resolutions than members of the three other groups. Regional disparities are even more striking when we break the analysis of resolutions by period. African support for Africa-focused resolutions that are put to a vote has become non-existent, and Asia-Pacific support is very modest. The other three groups were, and remain, steady supporters of Africa-focused resolutions.
  • The level of support for resolutions addressing African countries is lower than the level of support for resolutions addressing other countries. Given the near-total failure of Africa Group and Asia-Pacific Group members to support Africa-focused resolutions in recent sessions, the latter have been adopted with the support of only three groups: the Western, Eastern European, and Latin American and Caribbean groups of states.
  • The Council has reached a situation marked by division, in which leadership on Africa-focused resolutions that contain strong mechanisms or condemnatory language is assumed by non-African states. A number of resolutions that used to be consensual (Burundi, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan) have become adversarial, and several of these resolutions have moved from item 4 to item 2. The last period in the analysis (HRC45 to HRC55) crystallises these political divisions. More and more Africa-focused resolutions are put to a vote, and votes are closer than in the past (and closer than votes on non-Africa-focused resolutions). Considering that these trends cover several cycles of the HRC, these divisions are not simply attributable to variations in membership but rather reflect deeper shifts. It is more and more difficult for states that sponsor resolutions on African countries that are opposed by the countries concerned to get these resolutions adopted. It is also more and more challenging for African states (and to some extent, for Asia-Pacific states) to vote in favour of a resolution on an African country which the country concerned opposes.
  • The following factors and determinants of vote were found to be the most significant: (i) Agenda item number; (ii) Support/consent of the country concerned; (iii) Presence of condemnatory language in the resolution.

 

Patterns show that the tide might be turning. While many resolutions are still adopted by consensus, more and more resolutions on African countries are put to a vote. This significant and growing divide reflects broader geopolitical divisions. It makes it increasingly difficult for the Council to adopt resolutions that contain condemnatory and scrutiny elements, or that seek to establish or extend strong mechanisms, on African countries.

The data DefendDefenders and AfricanDefenders analysed show that when it comes to Africa-focused resolutions, the most significant divide is not between “Africa and the rest,” between “Africa and the West,” or between “the West and the rest,” but between two regional groups (Africa and Asia-Pacific) and the other three. Almost all of the negative votes and abstentions come from the former two; almost all positive votes come from the latter three.

At the same time, the African Group’s influence on country resolutions has become increasingly visible. African states exerting greater influence over resolutions that are put to a vote, in particular Africa-focused resolutions. This goes beyond the traditional strategy of influencing outcomes from “behind the scenes” (by deterring potential initiatives or taking initiatives into their own hands). From 2021-2023, votes and diplomatic processes showed that African states have become less and less hesitant to use their clout. As the Human Rights Council approaches its 20th anniversary, this move from a relatively discreet to a more public use of their influence might be one of the most striking evolutions in multilateral dynamics.

 


DOWNLOADS

Annex 1:
States’ votes on Africa-focused resolutions (2006-2024, HRC1-HRC55)
Excel spreadsheet — Three tabs: (i) All votes on Africa-focused resolutions; (ii) Votes on resolutions not at the initiative of the country concerned or the African Group; (iii) Breakdown by period (HRC1-HRC11 / HRC12-HRC22 / HRC23-HRC33 / HRC34-HRC44 / HRC45-HRC55)

Annex 2: (also in print version)
Database of countries that have been, or are, on the HRC’s agenda 

Annex 3: (also in print version)
Database of consensual and non-consensual Africa-focused resolutions (with a breakdown by session, by agenda item, and by period) 

Annex 4: (also in print version)
Votes on amendments to Africa-focused resolutions

 

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